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Abstract 
McCall (1970) examines the search behaviour of an infinitely-lived and risk-neutral job seeker maximizing her lifetime earnings 
by accepting or rejecting real-valued scalar wage offers. In practice, job offers have multiple attributes, and job seekers solve 
a multicriteria search problem. This paper presents a multicriteria search model and new comparative statics results. 
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Introduction 
In the search literature, the seminal work by McCall (1970) 
proposes a search model in which an infinitely-lived and risk-
neutral job seeker receives random real-valued wage offers 
from a known wage distribution. After receiving an offer, she 
has two options: accept the offer and end the search, or reject 
the offer and receive another offer in the next period. Her goal 
is to maximize her lifetime utility. In this framework, the 
optimal policy admits a threshold form, i.e., the job seeker 
accepts all offers above a reservation wage and rejects the 
others. 
In this paper, I show that McCall’s (1970) tractable result 
holds when job offers are characterized by multiple attributes 
and aggregated via a utility function. I also identify four 
distributional changes increasing the reservation utility to 
accept an offer.    
1. Multicriteria Search Model 
Consider a labor market in which every job offer has K 
attributes, i.e., w ∈ ℝK. Imagine an infinitely-lived job seeker 
who has time-separable preferences between offers. Suppose 
that utility function U represents the preference of each 
agent: ℝK → ℝ. In each period of unemployment, the job 
seeker receives a random wage offer from distribution 
F:ℝK → [0,1]. If she accepts the offer, then she works at the 
accepted job for all future periods. If she rejects the offer, then 
she receives an exogenously specified unemployment flow 
utility γ > 0 for a period and waits until the next period to 
receive another job offer. She discounts future utility with 
discount parameter β ∈ (0,1). Letting VF(w) denote the 
maximum possible discounted lifetime utility of the job seeker 
with current job offer w, and the Bellman equation can be 
specified as follows: 
VF(w) = max{(1 − β)
−1U(w), γ + EF{VF(w
′)}} (1) 
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Note that if the job seeker accepts an offer yielding to utility 
level u ∈ ℝ+, she also accepts offers yielding to higher utility 
levels. Similarly, if the job seeker rejects an offer yielding to 
utility level u′ ∈ ℝ+, then she also rejects offers yielding to 
lower utility levels. Since ℝ+ is a convex and ordered set, there 
exists a unique level of utility for which the job seeker is 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting it. Altogether, the 
following value function obtains: 
VF(w) =
{
 
 
U(w)
1 − β
U(w) ≥ uF
uF
1 − β
= γ + βEF{VF(w
′)} U(w) ≤ uF
 (2) 
Reservation utility 𝑢𝐹 solves the following equality: 
uF = γ +
β
1 − β
EF{max{U(w
′) − uF, 0}} (3) 
Theorem 1 Consider a set of real-valued utility functions U 
on ℝK such that H ∈ 𝐔 implies that (1 − β)−1max{H, u} ∈ 𝐔 
for all u ∈ ℝ+. Furthermore, let EF{H(w
′)} ≥ EG{H(w
′)} for 
all H ∈ 𝐔. Under these assumptions, the reservation utility is 
higher under F relative to G.  
Proof of Theorem 1 According to Equation (2), VF(w) can be 
written as follows for the optimal uF ∈ ℝ+: 
VF(w) = (1 − β)
−1max{U(w), uF} (4) 
We have VG(w) ≤ VF(w) as EF{H(w
′)} ≥ EG{H(w
′)} for all 
H ∈ 𝐔 and (1 − β)−1max{H, u} ∈ 𝐔: 
VG(w) = (1 − β)
−1max {U(w), γ + βEG{max{U(w
′), uG}}} 
≤ (1 − β)−1max {U(w), γ + βEF{max{U(w
′), uG}}} 
≤ (1 − β)−1max {U(w), γ + βEF{max{U(w
′), uF}}} 
= VF(w). 
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The first inequality follows from the assumptions of the 
theorem. The second inequality is a consequence of the 
optimality of uF under distribution F. As a result, the 
continuation value of search is higher under F relative to G:  
EG{VG(w
′)} ≤ EF{VG(w
′)} ≤ EF{VF(w
′)}. 
Consequently, the reservation utility is higher under F relative 
to G. ■ 
The critical observation is that the value function in 
Equation (4) is a positive affine transformation3 of the 
truncation4 of a positive affine transformation of the utility 
function. Suppose that utility function U(w) of w belongs to 
set of functions U which is closed under positive affine 
transformation and truncation. For such sets of functions, 
Theorem 1 can be used to obtain new comparative static 
results and understand the relationship between optimal 
strategy and the distribution of job offers. In the next section, 
I show that some standard sets of functions are closed under 
positive affine transformation and truncation.  
2. Multicriteria Comparative Statics 
In the search framework presented by McCall (1970), 
where w ∈ ℝ and U(w) = w, there are two well-known 
comparative static results. If (a) the probability of receiving a 
wage offer at least as high as w ∈ ℝ is higher under wage 
distribution F relative to G, or (b) F is obtained from G by 
spreading out probability mass without changing the mean, 
then the reservation wage is higher under F compared to G.   
  
(a) (b) 
Panel 1: McCall (1970) comparative statics 
First, I show that McCall’s (1970) comparative static 
results apply to the multicriteria search models.  
Definition 1 Utility function U:ℝK → ℝ is called  
(a) convex if U(λw + (1 − λ)w′) ≤ λU(w) + (1 − λ)U(w′) 
for all w,w′ ∈ ℝK and λ ∈ [0,1]; 
(b) componentwise convex if for all w,w′ ∈ ℝK such that 
wj = wj
′ for all j ≠ i for some i ∈ {1, … , K} and λ ∈ [0,1], it 
holds that U(λw + (1 − λ)w′) ≤ λU(w) + (1 − λ)U(w′).  
                                                          
3 The positive affine transformation of U(w) with parameters m ∈ ℝ+ and n ∈ ℝ+ is specified as mU(w) + n 
4 The truncation of U(w) is max{U(w), 0}. 
Definition 2 Given set of functions U, offer distribution 
F:ℝK → [0,1] dominates offer distribution G:ℝK → [0,1] on 
set U if EF{U(w
′)} ≥ EG{U(w
′)}.  
Theorem 2 The reservation utility is higher under F compared 
to G if for one of the following sets (*) F dominates G on the 
set and (**) the utility function belongs to the set: 
(a) set of increasing functions, 
(b) set of convex functions, and 
(c) set of component-wise convex functions. 
Theorem 2 shows that McCall’s (1970) classic comparative 
static results apply to a broader set of utility functions in the 
multicriteria framework (for proof, see the Appendix).  
In the multicriteria framework, we can also explore how 
complementarity and dependence between offer attributes 
affect the job seeker’s decision. In a practical sense, one might 
expect to observe complementarities between offer attributes. 
For example, earning a high wage in a city with a wide array 
of entertainment could be better for a job seeker relative to 
earning a high wage in the middle of nowhere. Furthermore, 
we can also expect dependence between offer attributes. High 
wage offers are often associated with better social benefits and 
health insurance packages.  
In the matching literature, complementarity is often modelled 
by using supermodularity. 
Definition 3 Utility function U:ℝK → ℝ is supermodular if for 
all w,w′ ∈ ℝK, it holds that 
U(w ∧ w′) + U(w ∨ w′) ≥ U(w) + U(w′) 
where ∧ and ∨ represent the component-wise minimum and 
maximum. 
It is important to note that the set of supermodular functions is 
not closed under truncation.  
Example 1 Let U(1,1) = U(2,2) = 5, U(1,2) = −5, and 
U(2,1) = 14. Note that U is supermodular. 
U(1,1) + U(2,2) = 10 ≥ 9 = U(1,2) + U(2,1) 
On the other hand, the truncation of U(w) of  w, defined as 
max{U(w), 0} and denoted by T{U(w)} is not supermodular. 
U(1,1) + U(2,2) = 10 < 14 = U(1,2) + U(2,1) 
In the appendix, I show that the set of increasing supermodular 
functions, i.e., both increasing and supermodular, is closed 
under truncation and positive affine transformation. Thus, the 
following theorem obtains. 
Theorem 3 The reservation utility is higher under F relative 
to G if F dominates G on the set of increasing supermodular 
functions, and the utility function is increasing supermodular.  
Theorem 3 states that if the job seeker’s preference exhibits 
complementarities across offer attributes, then an increase in 
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statistical dependence between offer attributes increases the 
reservation utility and contracts the set of acceptable offers.  
Muller and Scarsini (2012) propose ultramodularity as a 
multivariate convexity notion. A function is ultramodular if it 
is both supermodular and componentwise convex. The next 
theorem shows that ultramodularity can be used in 
multicriteria search models as a generalization of convexity 
while maintaining tractable comparative static results. 
Theorem 4 The reservation utility is higher under F relative 
to G if F dominates G on the set of increasing ultramodular 
functions, and the utility function is increasing ultramodular. 
Conclusion 
This paper presents a simple framework for multicriteria 
search models. It shows that the optimal strategy admits a 
threshold policy. Based on this form, it also proves that the 
classic comparative static results of single criteria search 
models apply (Theorem 2). It also offers new comparative 
static results with no counterpart in single criteria search 
models and establishes the relationship between increasing 
dependence between offer attributes and optimal search policy 
for a broad set of utility functions with minimal functional 
restrictions. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 2. It suffices to show the following sets are 
preserved under truncation and positive affine transformation. 
(a) set of increasing functions: trivial 
(b) set of convex functions 
Let U:ℝK → ℝ be a convex function. For all w,w′ ∈ ℝK and 
λ ∈ [0,1], it holds that  
U(λw + (1 − λ)w′) ≤ λU(w) + (1 − λ)U(w′). 
Truncation:  
T{U(λw + (1 − λ)w′)} = max{U(λw + (1 − λ)w′), 0} 
≤ max{λU(w) + (1 − λ)U(w′), 0}      (due to convexity of U) 
≤ λmax{U(w), 0} + (1 − λ)max{U(w′), 0}          
≤ λT{U(w)} + (1 − λ)T{U(w′)}          
Positive affine transformation with parameters m and n: 
m{U(λw + (1 − λ)w′)} + n 
≤ m{λU(w) + (1 − λ)U(w′)} + n     (due to convexity of U) 
≤ λ{mU(w) + n} + (1 − λ){mU(w′) + n}          
 
(c) set of componentwise convex functions: it can be proved 
by following the logic in the previous proof. ■ 
Proof of Theorem 3. 
It suffices to show that the set of increasing supermodular 
functions is closed under truncation and affine transformation. 
Let U:ℝK → ℝ be an increasing supermodular function. For 
all w,w′ ∈ ℝK, it holds that  
U(w ∧ w′) + U(w ∨ w′) ≥ U(w) + U(w′). 
The closedness under positive affine transformation is trivial. 
To prove the closedness under truncation define S(w,w′) as 
follows: 
T{U(w ∧ w′)} + T{U(w ∨ w′)} − T{U(w)} − T{U(w′)}. 
It suffices to show that S(w,w′) ≥ 0. Note that the value of 
T{U(∙)} depends on the sign of U(∙). Furthermore, many sign 
combinations for U(w ∧ w′), U(w ∨ w′), U(w), and U(w′) 
are not available due to U(∙) being an increasing function. 
After eliminating these cases, the number of potential 
combinations drops from 16 to 6. 
C1: U(w ∨ w′) < 0, U(w ∧ w′) < 0, U(w) < 0, U(w′) < 0 
S(w,w′) = 0 
C2: U(w ∨ w′) ≥ 0, U(w ∧ w′) < 0, U(w) < 0, U(w′) < 0 
S(w,w′) = U(w ∨ w′) ≥ 0 
C3: U(w ∨ w′) ≥ 0, U(w ∧ w′) < 0, U(w) ≥ 0, U(w′) < 0 
S(w,w′) = U(w ∨ w′) − U(w) ≥ 0 
C4: U(w ∨ w′) ≥ 0, U(w ∧ w′) < 0, U(w) < 0, U(w′) ≥ 0 
S(w,w′) = U(w ∨ w′) − U(w′) ≥ 0 
C5: U(w ∨ w′) ≥ 0, U(w ∧ w′) < 0, U(w) ≥ 0, U(w′) ≥ 0 
S(w,w′) = U(w ∨ w′) − U(w) − U(w′) 
≥ U(w ∨ w′) + U(w ∧ w′) − U(w) − U(w′) ≥ 0 
C6: U(w ∨ w′) ≥ 0, U(w ∧ w′) ≥ 0, U(w) ≥ 0, U(w′) ≥ 0 
S(w,w′) = U(w ∨ w′) + U(w ∧ w′) − U(w) − U(w′) ≥ 0■ 
